LOGISTICS TRANSFORMATION LAG
Putting transformation on the back burner and focusing solely on the fight at hand is simply not an option. We are fighting a war unlike any we have fought before -it demands new ways of thinking about military force, new processes to improve strategic agility, and new technologies to take the fight to the enemy. Funding priority and developmental focus invariably migrate to the combat systems, while logistic transformation ideas have been bogged down by parochialism and institutional neglect.
For over a decade now, we have pursued transformational change. No doubt the recent events in Operations Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom have catalyzed a stalled process to some degree. However, the radical and revolutionary change needed in the logistics
world has yet to take effect institutionally and with enduring results. Logistics transformation must become a priority or the overall Army transformation process will be detrimentally affected.
The lack of priority on logistic transformation is not new to the Army. An examination of the Red Ball Express during World War II, logistics initiatives during the Vietnam conflict, and Material
Management Center transformation will illustrate well that logistics has largely changed and evolved out of real time necessity rather than well thought out and deliberate transformation.
Moreover, these three examples will also highlight ad hoc logistics change driven by combat operations, institutional neglect concerning true logistics transformation, and the effect of parochialism in pursuing logistics transformation.
What is Transformation?
In order to fully understand military reform through history, one must understand transformation and how it differs from change. The dictionary defines change as "to make different the form, nature, content, future, course, etc," or "to transform or convert." 3 Simply put, it describes the transition when something goes from being the same to being different. 4 However, while change is inherent in transformation, there is a difference between changing and transforming. Change simply defines a shift based on current events or influences. It may be temporary or permanent. Transformation involves a thought process aimed at institutional and systemic shifts in education, doctrine, and culture. For transformation to be successful there must be an enduring change in culture and attitude.
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The 2001 Defense Science Board Report on Department of Defense Logistics
Transformation conclusions indicate that the logistics systems in the United States military must be transformed in order to maintain our position of global leadership. Failure to do so will significantly impair our ability to deploy and sustain our forces to meet new and future threats. The report indicates that our current logistics systems are based on a previous strategy of supporting in-place forces with scheduled deployment timelines as opposed to sustaining the expeditionary type force dictated in Vision 2010/2020. As such, we will not achieve our vision without logistics transformation.
Army Transformation is not just about new and improved equipment, it is about shifting from the Cold War linear battlefield construct to full spectrum combat operations. Maintaining and employing a logistical support system developed for the Cold War will not be supportive of full spectrum operations envisioned in future conflicts. To accomplish this change requires a shift in our logistics culture. Donald Rumsfeld, the former Secretary of Defense, set the stage for transformation in the Defense Planning Guidance published in 2003. He notes that transformation is… …a process that shapes the changing nature of military competition and cooperation through new combinations of concepts, capabilities, people and organizations that exploit our nation's advantages and protect against our asymmetric vulnerabilities to sustain our strategic position, which helps underpin peace and stability in the world.
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In simple terms, transformation is the process describing the current force becoming the future force as illustrated in Figure 1 . force to improve near-term operational capabilities in a Joint operating environment and achieve joint interdependence in logistics, which is depicted in Figure 2 . His vision for the end state is to produce:
• A modular "brigade-based" Army that is more responsive to regional combatant commanders' needs, better employs joint capabilities, facilitates force packaging and rapid deployment, and fights as self-contained units in non-linear, non-contiguous battle spaces.
• An Army logistics structure that is responsive to the needs of a Joint and Expeditionary force.
• A logistics system that eliminates redundancy and streamlines support by reducing unnecessary layers.
• A logistics capability that leverages emerging technologies, links support to supported organizations, and couples the Army to Joint organizations operating world-wide. Logistics transformation, while a relatively small portion of the Army's current plan, underpins almost every aspect of Army Transformation and the effort is a major step forward in achieving this required future force. The Army will focus its logistics transformation efforts on four key initiatives, in no particular order. First, is the development of a logistics data network that enables the warfighter to see requirements on demand. Second, the Army will build a responsive distribution system that guarantees on time delivery thus reducing the forward storage requirements. Third, the design and development of a modular force reception Canal. 15 As warned by the logisticians of the time, the forward movement of the Allied forces was stalled based on an inability to react to the large logistics distribution requirements and the unforeseen lack of French rail systems and rolling stock in the aftermath of bombing operations.
Supplies were sitting at the ports, beaches, and other hubs with no assets available to move them to the front where they were needed.
As a result, the "Red Ball Express" was born on 25 August 1944 in order to rush supplies to the rapidly advancing United States First and Third Armies. A clear example of adaptation while under fire, logisticians from across the theater pooled all available truck assets and created transportation trucking units to conduct theater distribution operations. 16 The intent was to conduct operations on one-way return highways, main supply routes, which were reserved specifically for logistics distribution. These routes ran from the supply hub to the forward bases and eventually forked at Versailles to the First Army in the north and Third Army in the south.
By 29 August, the Red Ball Express reached its peak at 132 truck companies, employing 5,958
vehicles, and on that day hauled a record 12,342 tons of supplies. 17 In total, the Red Ball 19 This was a stunning tribute to the logisticians of the time.
The Red Ball Express, while extremely successful, had limitations as well. Command and control of the operation was not as efficient and effective as it should have been; consequently, regional control was unmanageable. Likewise, shortages of Military Policemen led to a lack of control of the routes and failure to curtail the black market abuses. All these shortcomings could have been overcome had true logistics transformation occurred prior to the operation. While some innovations are born out of conflict, the Red Ball Express concept has helped sustain Army logistics for over 50 years even with the advent of current technological and organizational advances.
In Vietnam, for example, the Red Ball evolved into an emergency distribution process. A requisition would be submitted for a deadline piece of equipment to both the national inventory control point and to the supply base in Okinawa, Japan. The requisition would be processed by both organizations. If that part was immediately available in Okinawa, it would be walked through the system and placed on a Red Ball transportation asset. Whichever part arrived first would be used to bring the equipment to mission capable status and the other part would be placed on the shelf for future use in the hopes of avoiding a Red Ball request at a future date. States under the Continental Army Command. 27 The creation of the Army Materiel Command was a significant move to streamline Army supply at the wholesale level; however, it did not streamline sustainment in theater to deployed units. During the Vietnam era, each major subordinate command managed its own supplies and materiel to include budgeting, stockage, and distribution without regard to the available assets or requirements of the other commands. 28 In addition, within Army Materiel Command, inventory managers did not have visibility of worldwide requirements or assets and would often make procurement, distribution, and disposal decisions in the blind. In essence, reorganization occurred without transformation in management systems, techniques, and procedures which led to uncoordinated and inefficient supply actions.
The Army in Vietnam therefore relied on "mass logistics." In the absence of known and quantifiable requirements, users resort to, "just load the logistics system with supplies and inevitably what we need will be there." 29 As the evolution of our current logistic system continues, a major deficiency is apparent. No one at headquarters, Department of the Army level takes the overview of the total logistic system….Lack of overall logistic supervision at the Department of the Army level prevents the anticipation and identification of problems that develop between the source and the user….The staff supervision of the entire logistic system is a DCSLOG responsibility. 30 He succinctly identified a single agency for accountability and responsibility of logistics issues.
Once this decision was made and enforced, the gap created by the reorganization of the logistic systems could move forward very rapidly. Theater. More than $2.1 billion in surplus supplies were presented for screening. Of that, $306 million was redistributed in the Pacific Theater, $710 million was returned to the CONUS wholesale system, and over $1 billion was distributed to the fighting force. 31 What is remarkable is that the Army repeated this type of ad hoc logistics in Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm. Even with our advances in supply automation and distribution capability, mountains of supplies were shipped in support of operations in 1991, which were accounted for or distributed forward to units requesting them. As such, multiple orders were generated, magnifying the problem exponentially. The majority of this was largely due to the lack of confidence in supply and distribution systems resulting from the lack of real transformation during peacetime.
Material Management Transformation
Recent attempts at logistical transformation are to be found within ongoing material In our current zeal to transform in a rapid fashion, we have repeated the mistakes of the 1962 defense reorganization effort. That logistics reform effort took a full six years to implement workable processes to correct the gaps created in supporting the force. Currently, the Army faces a full three year process just to fill the capability gap created in the material management process within the logistics transformation framework. The alarming part of this realization was the identification of the gap by the units in the field to Forces Command. Yet, there was blatant disregard for developing a solution due to a belief that it was not Forces Command's responsibility to do so, nor was there any urgent effort taken to spur action on the part of Army Sustainment Command to initiate reform.
Conclusion
Transforming during a time of sustained campaigning will not be easy; but it is a practice that appears many times in the history of our great Army. We must examine, design, and develop new solutions for a new and dangerous world, as we have done so successfully in our past. This will require the deep and personal commitment of every member of the Army team -every leader, every Soldier, every civilian and every family member. Furthermore, DOD's current strategy to transform logistics lacks elements of an effective strategic plan, including specific performance goals, programs, milestones, and resources needed for achieving distribution objectives.
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The testimony also noted in regard to supply distribution that, although DOD has made progress, "the department's ability to make coordinated, systemic improvements that cut across the multiple organizations involved in the distribution system is stymied because of problems in defining who has accountability and authority for making such improvements and because the current logistics transformation strategy does not provide a clear vision to guide and synchronize future distribution improvement efforts." 39 In March 2004, the Army Chief of Staff identified four focus areas for the service's initiatives to improve logistics support, including supply distribution. The four focus areas were connecting Army logisticians, improving force reception, modernizing theater distribution, and integrating the supply chain. 40 These initiatives clearly support the Secretary of Defense's transformation efforts. Yet resourcing and parochialism continue to bog down the transformation process, actions that continue to impact our combat operations negatively.
As of August 2005, the Army had not fully funded two new communications and tracking systems to better connect logisticians on the battlefield, and thus has placed their fielding schedules in question. Future deploying units are now at risk at not obtaining the necessary capability to submit and monitor their supply requisitions effectively. In addition, the U.S.
Transportation Command was delayed in receiving funding to begin its interoperability of information technology supporting the distribution systems program and missed its deadline for developing a transition plan to guide future information technology investments. Moreover, due to parochialism, the Command has not been able to gain agreement from other DOD components on which of their existing information technology systems should be included in this effort to improve interoperability. 41 Furthermore, there is continual rhetoric on the requirement to reduce our logistics tail, yet there remains no emphasis on the development and resourcing of the enablers, specifically communications and automation. The Army's Operation Iraqi Freedom Study Group noted that our "decade-long effort to digitize logistics, adapt 'business practices' and promote efficiency over effectiveness [is] insufficient for [the] contemporary operating environment." 42 A look at the past 10-15 years demonstrates a lack of focus for logistics transformation. This period is riddled with multiple goal changes that may be attributed to leadership changes and differing viewpoints. The challenge is not in our ability to describe what we want, but rather an inability to define the concrete steps needed to reach our ever changing end state. 43 The result is numerous great ideas never progressing past the MS Power Point slide or contractor's pamphlet, resulting in a reluctance and failure to provide the required funding to realize true logistics transformation. General Kevin P. Byrnes, Commander of Training and Doctrine
Command, notes that "We need to create a culture of thinkers and innovators who look at a challenge and input a set of ways of doing it, not just apply band-aids and baling wire to fix old ways of doing business. 44 Though discouraging, evidence of positive action is currently coming to light. The current Assistant Chief of Staff, G4, Lieutenant General Ann Dunwoody, is committed to obtaining the funding needed to get the Global Combat Support System -Army (GCSS-A) program moving in a positive direction or taking the necessary steps to cancel the program for a more functional one. CASCOM is continuing to take aggressive, positive steps to keep the transformation process from stalling. In the interim, logisticians in the field will undoubtedly continue to demonstrate their operational agility and adaptive capabilities to provide ad hoc solutions to sustainment challenges until enduring logistics transformation can be realized.
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